This paper offers a review of the recent empirical literature on lobbying within Political Economy.
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this article is to provide a useful organization of the most recent empirical literature on lobbying in Political Economy. Starting from a definition of lobbying, we will specifically focus on the process of political influence by corporations and other business interests on elected officials or appointed bureaucrats through means of information or other resources (e.g. campaign contributions or employment opportunities) in the adoption, retention, or amendment of public policy. 1 To the reader interested in the topic and approaching it for the first time the research question at the bleeding edge of this literature will be immediately clear. Is lobbying and, more generally, the direct or indirect interaction between business interests and the government welfare enhancing for the general public and electorate? Or is it instead distortive and deleterious? Is lobbying a valid political mechanism "to petition the government for a redress of grievances", as
The National Institute for Lobbying & Ethics (a trade association representing American lobbyists) vividly asserts, borrowing from the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? 2 Or is it a tool for the distortion of public policy from the social optimum, a crucial cog in the mechanism of transforming concentrated economic power into political heft and corruption?
To the average voter the answer appears surprisingly unambiguous. The role of lobbyists and special interest groups in Washington was indicated as a "very big problem" by 53% of respondents to three surveys conducted by the Pew Center between September 2018 and March 2019. 1 For less recent work and a prospective more oriented towards Political Science, see De Figueiredo and Richter (2014) . For an earlier review of work on campaign contributions and money in politics more generally, see Stratmann (2005 Snyder (1989) . 9 The observation that lobbying expenditures dwarf PAC spending was made forcefully in Milyo, Primo and Groseclose (2000) 10 It should be noted that committee fund raising and expenditures are much higher if we take into account independent expenditures and independent expenditure-only committees (i.e. SuperPAC's): the yearly amount raised vary between 600 million and 1.5 billion dollars. 11 Other organizations such as 5019(c)5 and 501(c)6 (business groups) are also subjects to similar regulation, while tax-exempt 501(c)3 are not allowed to engage in political spending.
on the website and among those 11 percent had some association to the Republican party and about 10 percent to the Democratic party. Around 1 percent of the lobbyists were former members of Congress while 2 percent of the biographies mentioned some experience in the White House.
Former aides were 11 percent of the sample.
Facts about Lobbying Clients
The LDA explicitly requires that the registrant file a separate report for each client, which can be a firm, a non-corporate organization or an individual. The CRP led the effort to homogenize and aggregate lobbying expenditures by clients, facing the difficulty of often misspelled client names.
The CRP reports that in 2018 the largest spending was by industry associations, such as the US Chamber of Commerce (almost $94 million), the National Association of Realtors and the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, together with 501(c)4 organization
Open Society Policy Center and large corporations such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield ($24 million), Alphabet Inc and AT&T. The economics literature has focused on lobbying by firms, and business interests more in general, because those entities tend to focus their lobbying not on ideological issues, but on policies such as tariffs, subsidies, banking regulations and taxation that have a key impact on the allocation of resources in the economy.
One of the first efforts to match firms to their political activity using Compustat North America was Grier, Munger and Roberts (1994) . 14 Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) linked lobbying records to Compustat's corporations, but only for the subset of firms involved in lobbying for trade issues. Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009) and Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2014) performed a more comprehensive linking exercise covering a large portion of Compustat's firms lobbying on all issues. When it comes to linking lobbying records of public firms to standard
Compustat identifiers, such as gvkey's, which in turn allows the researcher to link other firmlevel balance sheet variables, the state-of-the-art website is www.LobbyView.org, described in detail in Kim (2018) . The dataset is employed in Huneeus and Kim (2019), discussed later.
14 Bombardini (2008) Conditional on lobbying, Huneeus and Kim (2019) show that the elasticity of lobbying expenditure to total firm sales is around 1, confirming that size affects lobbying both at the intensive and extensive margin. Second, lobbying is persistent: Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2014) report that 92% of firms that lobby in a given year, also lobby in the next year. 16 Such persistence is explained by the presence of large sunk costs in setting up political presence.
Firms are not the only business-related entities that engage in lobbying. In fact smaller firms are likely to participate through their membership in industry-wide organizations. This is a phenomenon at the core of Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) , who show that industries with lower industry concentration and lower product differentiation tend to spend a higher share of the lobbying expenditure through trade associations. Using more recent figures, Huneeus and Kim (2019) confirm though the one by individual firms is the more prevalent form of lobbying.
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3 QUID-PRO-QUO LOBBYING
STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES TO QUID-PRO-QUO LOBBYING
There are important advantages in taking a structural approach to the empirical analysis of lobbying. First, structural models require an explicit definition of the full set of theoretical assumptions at the basis of the analysis. It forces the researcher to spell out precisely all relevant features of the research problem, starting from its primitive parameters and data generating process. In this sense, the structural approach requires clarity on what both F and P get out of their exchange (quid pro quo). Second, the structural econometric approach requires a more rigorous consideration of the theoretical assumptions, which need actual empirical validation to 15 Unsurprisingly, this is also the case for PAC contributions, as reported, among others, by Grier, Munger and Roberts (1994) and Bombardini (2008) . 16 Persistence of lobbying and its consequences is also at the core of Druttman (2015) . 17 Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) report an average share of lobbying by individual firms of 67%, with a median of 96%. Huneeus and Kim (2019) report lobbying by business associations to be less than a quarter of all lobbying expenses.
deliver sensible parameter estimates and in-sample fit. Most assumptions in empirical models cannot merely pass intuitive/qualitative scrutiny, but must actually fit the data without inducing nonsensical estimates along any dimension of the parameter space. Assumptions face immediate discipline by the data (individually or jointly) and often can be verified and rejected. Finally, structural approaches in Political Economy are not exclusively useful for counterfactual analysis or out-of-sample prediction, but they can deliver certain parameter estimates that may be of independent genuine research interest themselves. Some of these parameters, for example, are the latent returns to lobbying or the unobserved fixed costs of political participation for a special interest. We present a few notable examples in this section.
Kang (2016) offers one of the rare instances where equilibrium policy success, multiple lobbying decisions by special interest groups in favor or against each policy dimensions (the quid of the quid pro quo) and economic returns to lobbying are all, simultaneously modeled within the same econometric framework. This nontrivial feat is accomplished first by presenting a detailed measure for the outcome of the lobbying process in the context of U.S. energy sector: the approval or rejection of a specific policy proposal (e.g. a solar energy production subsidy)
identified through the application of natural language processing (NLP) tools to congressional bill texts. We underscore how, in order to keep the policy proposals relatively comparable with each other, the author focuses on the energy policy, affecting an important, but tightly circumscribed industry. In order to obtain a complete picture of failing and succeeding proposals, the author focuses further on a single legislative term, the 110 th Congress. And finally, to precisely trace the ultimate fate of each policy, Kang decouples policies from the various legislative bills "carrying" those policy proposals. 18 The paper studies 538 policies that are included in 445 bills requiring extensive NLP pre-analysis.
Kang (2016) frames the lobbying game as a series of contests among multiple special interests for the policies adopted by one P. The set of F's consists of four coalitions representing four 18 For instance, the author reports several instances where policy Q1 and Q2 are part of the same bill, the bill fails, but then policy Q2 is carved out and added to a new bill, which then passes. Likely, omitting this refinement of the data and focusing only on bill passage could lead to severe mismeasurement of the effects of lobbying. In essence, just the preparatory data effort of Kang is substantial and the attention to institutional detail becomes crucial. Political science researchers, such as Baumgartner et al. (2009) From lobbying reports then the author links each special interest group to each policy, measuring whether each F lobbies P on each policy and whether F supports or opposes it. Interestingly, policies that are not associated with lobbying activity tends to be rarely enacted (1% of cases).
Policies where two or more players lobby are much more likely to pass (24%) and differentially so depending whether all F's are on the same side of the issue or not, implying substantial selection in the data. Overall, only 8% of all policies are eventually enacted.
There is no informational role of lobbying in the model and the problem is a game of complete information. Conditional on lobbying expenditures (s1,…,s4), this enactment probability is modeled as a modification of the standard Tullock (1967) contest function, which is normally in the form pi = (si) β /∑j(sj) β for generic nonzero expenditures (otherwise pi = 1 if sj≠i = 0 and si >0).
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The modifications to the context function applied by Kang allow for additional group parameters modeling the effectiveness of lobbying against or in favor of a policy, and for a baseline probability of enactment different from one, absent competition from other F's.
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Under these assumptions, the subgame spending phase equilibrium where the vector (s1,…,s4) is determined is unique given entry, but the entry decision phase displays multiplicity. Generally, we only know that at least one mixed strategy equilibrium of the game exists. As necessary in the structural estimation of models with multiple equilibria, the author imposes a selection argument and focuses on the equilibrium that maximizes the sum of all the players' payoffs as criterion.
Focusing on this specific equilibrium, Kang aims at recovering influence, baseline enactment probabilities and cost parameters so to maximize the likelihood of observing the empirical policy enactment, lobbying participation, and total lobbying expenditures recorded in the data. As several equilibrium objects do not have a closed-form representation, simulation methods are required for this.
With parameter estimates at hand, the author can then simulate the equilibrium enactment probability and the baseline passage probability in a scenario without lobbying for each policy, conditional on the observable characteristics of the policy and lobbying coalitions. This is a crucial counterfactual of the paper, aiming at the key questions of what are the effects of lobbying. In fact, the difference between the enactment probability with and without lobbying can be thought of as a dimension of the (model-dependent) effect of lobbying.
Surprisingly, here such effect is extremely small, between 0.021 and 0.415 percentage points relative to a baseline of 8 percent enactment probability. While intuition could suggest that lobbying efforts in favor and against enactment may be cancelling each other à la Becker (1983), part of the problem is in the extreme insensitivity of the success likelihood at the margin, which may be potentially indicate a form of model misspecification 22 . The author also estimates average returns to lobbying in the range between 137% for Renewables and 152% for Oil and Gas, which are conversely very high. This result emerges from an estimated average monetary value of each policy of more than $500 Million, possibly another indication of some form of misspecification.
Beyond Kang (2016), however, excessive political returns on political investments are common in this literature. A second special interest politics paper following a structural approach offers a possible explanation for this specific puzzle.
Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) presents a quid-pro-quo model of policy influence that is structurally estimated on campaign contributions for the United States Congress. The paper presents a model of multilateral bargaining across heterogeneous special interests F and a single politician P. The authors emphasize how SIG donations may interact nonlinearly with the electoral bloc of votes associated with that special interest, under the assumption of some alignment of interests between workers and owners of capital (which is typically the case through profit sharing or job security motives).
22 According to the structural estimates, 40% of the lobbying expenditures cancel out, so this cannot explain the null enactment probability effect. Further, the effect of lobbying expenditures is small even when there are no opposing interventions present. By highlighting along which dimensions the structure of the problem produces counterintuitive estimates the paper offers the contribution of narrowing the spectrum of issues needing further investigation. This is a benefit of the quantitative approach followed by Kang, rather than a weakness. The paper's first intuitive contribution is to highlight how special interest influence may be the results of multiple tools employed simultaneously and with specific patterns of substitution between them. In the analysis, the authors show how large special interests who carry a substantial employment presence in a congressional district (and therefore have the power of potentially swaying elections for House members through the mobilization of their employees)
may not have the necessity of providing much in the way of campaign contributions to obtain the same policy benefit as electorally smaller groups. P will deliver the preferred policy by F, "or else…".
The evidence of access by large employers to local representatives is vast and lines up with research on incentives for access and politics (Austen-Smith, 1995; Fouirnaies and Hall, 2018) .
However, the authors report systematic inverse-U shaped relationships between the amount of total campaign spending by sector in a congressional district and employment in a district by industry (peaking at around 18,000 industry employees). The same relationship also holds within industry, where total campaign spending across congressional districts concentrates in areas where industry employment presence is neither too big, nor too small.
Such non monotonic relationships could be easily illustrated through simple nonparametric reduced-form evidence. Here, however, the authors show the benefit of a structural approach by recovering from the first-order conditions of political spending an estimate of the marginal rate of substitution of campaign donations per vote acquired. 23 This approach explicitly determines a "dollar per vote" estimate between $200 and $400, depending on the specific district and media market. Such costs are then used by the authors to determine the total economic value to the politician of the special interest's support and to recover a more precise estimate of the average rate of returns on political spending.
The magnitude of such returns has been extensively debated. Ansolabehere, de Figueireido, Snyder (2003) ask why is there so little money in American Politics relative to the economic returns that one could infer from the economic magnitude of the discretionary policy programs implemented by the U.S. government. Essentially, low amounts of campaign contributions and the fact that federal campaign donations caps are very seldom binding stride in the face of the 23 More precisely, convinced through campaign spending. The paper relies on the intuition from Baron (1994) of a fraction of voters to be susceptible of persuasion or "uninformed" to use the terminology of the original paper.
very large economic gains from government intervention. The implied (huge) rates of return seem to suggest massive failure from entry and limits to arbitrage, a phenomenon known in the literature as the Tullock's puzzle -from the original discussion of Tullock (1972) . A typical example would be the Farm Bill in the United States. In 2000 it included $22 Billion of subsidies to the U.S. agribusiness lobby vis-à-vis less than $3.7 Million in campaign contributions from agribusiness special interest groups (PACs) during that electoral cycle. From this perspective, this amounts to $6,000 of subsidies for every $1 of political contributions: A rate of return of 600,000%. This should strike the reader as obviously not economically reasonable (competition in the political market should arbitrage away these rents).
The quantitative analysis in Bombardini and Trebbi (2011) shows that one of the reason for this puzzle is that the Ansolabehere et al. approach typically counts political contributions as the only channel of influence, while there may be multiple and less easy to measure ones. For instance, if the electoral weight of a special interest group (its number of employees) is as important as a channel of influence as campaign donations and the cost of buying a vote is relatively high, implied returns for F appear much more reasonable when all is included.
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With the Kang's or Bombardini and Trebbi's political return estimates at hand, one is still short of a welfare assessment or even policy efficiency considerations. What are the distortions induced by these special interest activities relative to a hypothetical counterfactual where lobbying were absent?
In a more recent contribution, Huneeus and Kim (2019) offer an answer to this key question by studying input misallocation due to political influence activity in the United States. The authors focus on the question on whether lobbying, which may be employed by specific firms and with different intensity, may be a relevant quantitative mechanism for the creation of wedges between marginal return and marginal cost of input (specifically capital), inducing politically influential firms to grow larger. This is a crucial question in the study of special interest politics, as the 24 Mobilizing the 4 million farmers and agribusiness-connected voters in 2000 surely had a political value. Under this perspective, the rate of return to political activity of the agricultural special interest $22 Billion / ($3.7 Million + $400*4 Million) = $13.7 for every dollar of political contributions at the margin. While still a high figure, it appears as already a more reasonable estimate for the case of agriculture (i.e. not $6,000). In fact, the paper provides evidence from simulations of average returns to political donations in the range of 10-20% per year. Notice that these considerations are a clear benefit of structurally modeling lobbying as they are based on estimated primitives from the theory.
accumulation of political influence may feed into economic distortions and rent creation. The acquisition of rents fostered by lobbying further feeds back on the resources available for political influence and regulatory capture, in a vicious cycle where profits, anticompetitive pressures, and political clout self-reinforce and perpetuate (Gutierrez and Philippon, 2019).
Huneeus and Kim (2019) present a general equilibrium model augmented by a structural framework to allow a precise estimate of the magnitudes of these distortions. This structural approach is based on a model with heterogeneous firms, which have to pay a fixed cost to play a political influence game and subsequently invest a continuous amount on lobbying based on their expected policy returns. The heterogeneity of firms is governed by a multidimensional vector of productivity and lobbying capacity draws (more precisely, a Hicks-neutral productivity term, a lobbying productivity term, and an exogenous wedge type draw). The estimator is first implemented by having a subset of parameters normalized and calibrated. Then, the model is simulated for a certain parameter vector value, including the fixed costs, the variances and covariances of the types distribution, and the returns to lobbying (these are the parameters to be estimated). Drawing from the data generating process, the model produces a series of simulated moments that then can be matched to the data. The empirical moments include the share of firms who lobby for each industry, the dispersion of firm sales within industry (which relates to productivity dispersion), and the relationship between lobbying spending and firm size, which is identified through congressional committee shocks. As typical in this literature, a minimum distance estimator based on the difference between simulated and actual moments is employed.
Although theoretical identification (uniqueness of the parameter vector minimizing the criterion)
is not assured (and it should be probed by Monte Carlo simulations), the solution proposed by the authors appears stable.
Methodologically, as firm lobbying activities are endogenous to an entire roster of other economic activities driving revenues, the authors focus on identifying a credible shock to lobbying productivity. As it is necessary to emphasize, structural methods are dependent on solid identifying variation as much as reduced-form approaches and therefore this first step is essential. The authors here rely on policy supply shocks: the idiosyncrasies of congressional committee assignments, which vary the specific value of a local political representative to a firm.
This form of identification strategy is common in this literature (see the discussion in the following subsection and Powell and Grimmer, 2016) and relies on the fact that many of the committee membership changes happening in the U.S. Congress are related to party seniority, majority party status, and other presumably exogenous determinants with respect to firm decisions.
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Using this identification strategy, the authors show that a 10 percent increase in lobbying produces a 3 percent increase in revenue. Notice that the exact measurement of which policies are distorted and by how much is not provided. Nonetheless, the estimated model can be ultimately tweaked to answer the counterfactual questions, including shutting down the availability of lobbying and re-computing the model's equilibrium choices and firm size distributions. Firms' federal lobbying is estimated to induce a 22 percent reduction in aggregate productivity in the United States. This is a large negative general equilibrium effect. In addition, 59 percent of this reduction is determined by misallocation of resources to lobbying firms (which are less productive) and 41 percent due to lack entry of new more productive firms.
REDUCED-FORM ECONOMETRIC APPROACHES TO QUID-PRO-QUO LOBBYING
A quid-pro-quo approach to lobbying frames the problem essentially as an exchange of political resources for policy adoption. All the structural papers mentioned in the previous section need to specify explicitly what F demands from P and at what cost and what P is willing to supply to F and to what personal benefit.
This coincidence of policy demand and supply needs not to be resolved through a competitive political market where prices are posted, and most likely it is not. 26 Sacrificing realism, it is 25 To be more precise, first the authors connect large public firms and their employment base to certain politician (U.S. Senators representing states where firms have their headquarters). Then, they consider the set of policy issues relevant to those firms among the set of their connected politicians and use shocks to this set to obtain variation to the productivity of lobbying for each firm. Such shocks include how issues relevant to firms vary over time relative (e.g. liability issues for tobacco manufacturers) to the set of politicians to whom the firm may have an electoral connection (e.g. a local senator sitting on the Congressional Judiciary Committee), or how the set of politicians to whom the firm is electorally relevant vary as Congress members move in or out of congressional committees relevant for those firms' policy issues (the value of the same senator moving from the Congressional Judiciary Committee to Armed Services). 26 In fact, some of the early approaches to policy for sale were designed as menu auctions (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and other quid-pro-quo models rely on bargaining (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Bombardini and Trebbi, 2011) .
nonetheless useful to present a minimal framework of supply and demand akin to a standard partial equilibrium setting to clarify the different perspective taken by the recent reduced-form papers that we study. Much of the work on reduced-form empirical lobbying that we will discuss in this section focuses either on shocks to F that drive up or down the demand for policy or on shocks on P, which determine the supply of policy for every dollar of lobbying spent.
Assume a stylized functional form for the demand for a policy objective = − by F and its supply = by the policy maker, P, assuming linear pricing and that is a per unit price of the policy. Typically, this price will not be a variable that the econometrician observes, so we need to transform this demand system into a system of revenue (or political expenditure) and quantity. Thus, let us define by = the total amount spent on lobbying, which is the variable we normally observe in federally disclosed reports. We can simply derive demand and supply equations in terms of and : = 1−1/ and = 1+1/ . It is easy to verify that, if > 1
(the elasticity of demand is larger than one), then both schedules will be upward sloping, as depicted in Figure 1 .
Using this framework, it is straightforward to reinterpret, for example, policy demand shifters as useful sources of identification to measure / . This is consequential as it allows to answer the question of how much "policy" an extra dollar of lobbying buys. This is, of course, also closely related to the parameter , since an extremely low value of implies that policy is essentially "not for sale" and × = 1+ approaches zero.
In Figure 1 an increase in the demand for policy, caused by a shift in the parameter helps to identify parameters of . Such identifying variation is clearly related to the policy needs of firm F (such as the demand of protection from foreign competition in presence of adverse technological or financial shocks 27 ). Similarly, reduced-form papers related to the demand of lobbying services (ultimately related to the demand of policy ) can be identified by shifts in .
Shocks to politicians P (such as sudden jumps in the ability of a local representative to deliver pork to his constituency) are going to be the key for identification along this dimension. 
Policy Supply and Identification through Shocks to F
The concept of identifying policy supply conditions through firm demand shifters is exemplified by De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) . They study the process by which universities (special interests that for all intents and purposes here will be considered equivalent to F) lobby to obtain federal earmark grants. The authors specify a policy demand side in which universities decide how much to invest in lobbying expenditures based on its expected productivity in obtaining grants. In fact, the authors set out to estimate a parameter of the production function for earmarks, namely the productivity of lobbying expenditures. As anticipated before, one can reinterpret this parameter as a policy supply characteristic, in that it is related to the inverse of the supply slope, i.e. / and to the effect of an additional dollar of lobbying the amount of earmark grants won by the university.
To obtain identification, the authors exploit the fact that different universities face different overhead rates. High overhead rates make grants more valuable for a university, because the institution retains a higher percentage of the grant to cover university-wide costs. Therefore, higher overheads induce a shift in the demand for the policy, which can then be used to estimate Economic Recovery Act grants, the two outcome measures considered by the authors.
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It is, however, worth remarking one specific issues raised by Goldstein and You: federal lobbying in this case may be benign and efficiency enhancing, in the sense of actually being effective at rebalancing the distortions induced by the political opposition between city and state governments. This is an issue, for instance, if the equilibrium absent lobbying is further from the social optimum due to distortions from partisan frictions.
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Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2014) describe a shock to the demand side of policy in the specific context of work visa caps. They exploit the pre-determined expiry of a temporary H1B visa cap 28 The authors employ geographic distance from Washington DC as their IV. This is a common identification approach, used for similar instances in Igan, Mishra and Tressel (2009) and Lambert (2019), but arguably subject to criticism from a standpoint of exclusion restriction. 29 A cumulate measure of total federal transfers to the municipality should be employed to precisely estimate the effective rate of return to lobbying and the supply elasticity. Unfortunately, this is not considered in the article. 30 Such frictions can take many forms, including inefficient policy enactment or lack of response to crises. See also Mian et al. (2010 Mian et al. ( , 2013 for how electoral constituencies may not be effective in preventing this.
to study the reaction in the lobbying effort by firms differentially affected by the cap reduction.
Firms are classified as dependent on high-skill immigration based on the ethnic composition of their innovators and their past filings to the Department of Labor of Labor Condition
Applications.
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The authors find that, after the visa cap reduction, F's lobbying focused on high-skill immigration doubles as a share of total lobbying. Firms classified as high-skill-immigrationdependent under the paper's criteria increase their lobbying and the effect is much stronger for those firms that lobbied in the past on any issue (not just immigration). The authors attribute this persistency to a large initial fixed cost for firms to start lobbying, compared to the fixed cost of lobbying on a specific issue such as immigration. As we have seen in Section 2, such fixed costs appear a realistic dimension of the data.
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Policy Demand and Identification through Shocks to P
Shocks to the ability of P to deliver policy favorable to F are ideal sources of identification for tracing the profile of F's policy demand function. In addition, as firms demand policy favors and because policy favors require lobbying efforts, firms will demand services by lobbyists (L). This section will present a few reduced-form applications that operate in this space and show the identification role of shocks to P in this case. It will also show how information on the market for L may be ultimately useful for learning about .
33
In the group of papers estimating the effects of shocks to political targets P on lobbying, Blanes i
Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012) is remarkable for its simplicity and sharpness. The article investigates the value of political connections in lobbying by estimating the revenue loss experienced by former Senate staffers-turned-lobbyists when the Senator for whom they worked exits politics. To be more precise, the authors evaluate how ex-government officials convert their 31 LCA's are necessary to hire a worker under the H-1B visa program. 32 More generally, these results have also important implications about the dangers of policy hysteresis and lack of representation in a system where entry costs are prohibitive for a large fraction of the entities affected by policy. 33 We wish to point out that the use of shocks to P may also be useful to detect more subtle and opaque forms of political influence. Political shifters are also useful in answering broader special interest politics questions about the market for L. "What do lobbyists exactly do?" is one of these questions. As mentioned in the Introduction, some believe that lobbyists mainly provide the firms and other special interests they represent with access to politicians in their "circle of influence" and essentially help facilitate vote-buying. Others believe that lobbyists' main role is to provide information and expertise to congressmen to guide the legislative decision-making process (at the very least, lobbyists trade associations promote this view). Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2014) evaluate the relative economic importance of these two views of lobbying.
The authors' main empirical approach consists in asking whether L mainly "sticks to" P, as a political connection a la Blanes i Vidal et al., or whether L mainly "sticks to" specific policy issues. If lobbyists provide companies with access to politicians within their "circle of 34 As standard, revenues generated by lobbyists from each client are obtained from reports compiled by the CRP from SOPR. The directory www.lobbyist.info is instead used to obtain career history and other observable characteristics (gender, education, etc.) of lobbyists, while the data on former staffers is obtained from Congressional Staffer Salaries database maintained and published from LegiStorm 2012. 35 Surprisingly such effects are also insignificant for staffers-turned-lobbyists in the House of Representatives.
influence," one would expect lobbyists' job assignments to be determined mostly by the identity of the politicians, independently of the specific issues being decided upon. A logical implication is then that a lobbyist should "follow" a closely connected congress member as she or he moves from one committee assignment to another. In contrast, if L mainly provides expertise, one would expect L to be much more strongly attached to specific issues of competence (and hence specific committees or subcommittees), independently from which P's populate them or whether P moves.
The authors find evidence of lobbyists taking up new issues as the politicians they have been in contact with in the past change committee assignment, which is consistent with a relationshipbased view of lobbying. Similarly, they also find that the return premium to being an expert in an issue does not increase when the issue becomes more relevant in Congress. These facts point towards an economic dominance of political access motives over expertise.
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When further sub-sampling the data, the authors find that lobbyists for whom access should be relatively more important in the political market (for instance, former members of Congress turned lobbyists) are more likely to follow their politicians. Moreover, when a new politician is assigned to a congressional committee, it appears that the lobbyists that are active on that committee take steps to gain access to this new politician (in particular in the form of contributions to the politician's campaign), which is inconsistent with a pure expertise view of lobbying.
Another paper focusing on political shifts to assess influence is DellaVigna, Durante, Knight, and La Ferrara (2016). The paper examines an indirect channel of lobbying to curry favor from conflicted politicians.
Silvio Berlusconi, an Italian politician and media tycoon, was the Italian PM for three terms during the period 1993-2009. His fluctuating political fortunes and movement in and out of office as Italian premier offer the identifying variation at the basis of this article. Market-based lobbying -to use the terminology coined by the authors -takes place by regulated firms via shifting their advertising spending onto Mediaset (Mr. Berlusconi's firm) TV channels (and away from others avenues of commercial advertising) during Berlusconi's periods in office. P, in this application, transitions in and out of power and so do Mediaset advertising revenues.
The authors conjecture that the strategic channeling of advertising spending underlies a quid-proquo in exchange for regulatory lenience. In fact, the paper establishes that the strategic shifting of ad spending is exclusive pertinence of firms in heavily regulated industries. Moreover, the large amounts of advertising spending, running in the hundreds of millions of Euros, make for an economically relevant channel.
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To conclude, the discussion about market-based lobbying connects also to a broader literature on identifying the value of political connections for firms. This empirical literature is vast and has in
Fisman (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2005) , Faccio (2006) some of its earliest and most striking empirical applications. Pertaining more closely to lobbying, Borisov, Goldman and Gupta (2016) focus on the negative shock originating from the 2006 Jack Abramoff legal scandal and the loss of value for corporations engaged in lobbying around that event.
INFORMATIONAL LOBBYING: THEORY VS MEASUREMENT
An area of research that has seen slow progress is the one measuring and providing evidence in favor of informational lobbying. The starting point for this approach is a view dear to interest groups and lobbyists themselves and that is that policy making is complicated and therefore that P can benefit from receiving information from F, even though such entities have an incentive to skew the information transmitted to the policy maker. There is a rich and nuanced theoretical literature that provides a variety of mechanisms that find a positive role played by communication between F and P. After a brief summary of these theories, we move on to the thornier question of whether the data support the predictions of these theories. The short answer is that the evidence points to some form of information being supplied, but not all the evidence lines up with the type of information that is beneficial to the public at large. 37 To the skeptical reader, we remark that to curry favor in such not-so-subtle fashion is paradoxically legal in Italy, due to the absence of a conflict of interest statute (often debated by parties in opposition to Silvio Berlusconi during his periods in power, but never enacted).
Models of informational lobbying start from the premise that the policy maker is less informed than the interest group, but at the same time she understands that she cannot take the information that F passes to her at face value because it will always tend to distort the information in its favor. There are two broad categories of models: cheap talk models and costly lobbying models.
In cheap talk models some information can be credibly revealed only in a "rough" way. An interest group can rarely communicate exactly the value of some important variable, but can communicate whether such value lies in a range. 38 The boundaries of such range are given by the group's incentive to lie. The more aligned its preferences are with the policy maker's, the more precise the information communicated (Krishna and Morgan, 2001 and Grossman and Helpman, 2001 ). In the presence of multiple interest groups, this theory predicts a welfare-enhancing role of groups with opposite biases relative to the policy maker preferences, because it induces a less coarse information transmission. 39 This is a result we will refer to later in this section.
In contrast, theories of costly lobbying are essentially money-burning models where lobbying expenditures serve the purpose of signaling the underlying state of the world to the politician. Potters and van Winden (1992) is an early example where such lobbying costs are fixed and exogenous, but Grossman and Helpman (2001) illustrate how the logic easily extends to lobbying costs that are chosen by the interest group: the higher the cost chosen, the more extreme must be the underlying variable that the policy maker needs to learn about. The important predictions of these models is that welfare can be higher for all parties involved, even when lobbying is an inherently wasteful activity. This welfare result carries through to more sophisticated hybrid models where talk is cheap, but there is a fee for access that can coarsely signal the otherwise unknown preference of the interest group (Lohmann, 1995 and AustenSmith, 1995) . A related, but distinct theory of lobbying is offered by Hall and Deardorff (2006) , who hypothesize that information plays the role of a subsidy to otherwise resource-strapped legislators.
40 38 Full revelation is easier to achieve if information and the policy space are multi-dimensional as in Battaglini (2002) , but there are exceptions. We do not discuss here this voluminous literature. 39 The intuition here is that each interest group can credibly communicate in a separate section of the underlying variable and therefore the information becomes more detailed. 40 Their theory explains why lobbyists appear to lobby friendly legislators and questions the persuasion role of the process. Schnakenberg (2016) revives the persuasive role of lobbying by postulating that the information provided by interest groups to friendly legislators can be used to persuade their less friendly colleagues.
Let us now turn to whether this potentially virtuous interaction of interest groups with policy makers is supported by the available empirical evidence. It is obviously inherently difficult to measure information exchanges, where what is said by firms to politicians is often not known.
This scarcity compounds the already-cited difficulties common to quid-pro-quo studies in measuring policy variables (i.e. the "output" of the lobbying process).
It is because of these difficulties that the evidence we have so far about the extent of informational lobbying is very indirect. One of the ways in which researchers had to creatively circumvent these availability and measurement issues is to look elsewhere for clues about The most interesting empirical regularities that emerge are: i) the presence of any lobbying contact is more likely for lobbyists that are more ideologically aligned with politicians; ii) 41 Party affiliation is collected from Washington Representatives available at lobbyistinfo.com conditional on the lobbyist having any contact with the politician, she brings him fewer clients when her ideology is more similar to the politician's and when she has a prior connection to a Member of Congress.
The first empirical finding echoes the familiar pattern that interest groups tend to lobby friendly legislators (Salisbury et al., 1989; Snyder 1990 Snyder , 1991 Snyder and 1992 , a fact that has been invoked often in the theoretical literature as a validation of the common prediction that communication is credible only if the preferences of sender and receiver are sufficiently aligned (Helpman, 2001, ch.5) . The second empirical result is more nuanced and is partially explained by the model.
Lobbyists that are ideologically closer 42 or connected through past employment to politicians set a higher "certification threshold": the case brought to them by the interest group has to be more favorable to the politician in order to gain representation from the lobbyist. We will return to the difference between these two findings after reviewing another set of results that speak to the informational view of lobbying in Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2014) . In that paper, as previously discussed, the focus was distinguishing between connections and expertise as a source of returns to lobbying. Although the main message of the paper is that connections seem to be driving a lot of the patterns of mobility and returns to lobbying, the authors do not rule out that information was still important in the activity of lobbyists. Let us again point to two specific results. The first is that, whenever politicians do have contacts with those lobbyists that we classified as experts (based on how concentrated their lobbying work was on a specific topic), those lobbyists have a more balanced distribution in terms of party affiliation than the nonexperts. This indirectly validates one of the key predictions of informational lobbying models with multiple senders. In those models listening to senders with opposing "biases" generates a better informed P.
The second relevant finding in Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2014) is that the returns to lobbyists affiliated (through past employment as staffers for example) with a given party move with the party's fortune in terms of control of the two Chambers of Congress and of the Presidency. 42 The model actually predicts that selectivity increases as the ideological distance between the interest group and the lobbyist increases, but such fine prediction is difficult to take to the data.
We believe there is a subtle, but important, distinction to be drawn between the two types of information that these distinct findings point to. While there is information that leads to overall better policy for the general population, there is another type of information that is particularly beneficial to a specific politician or her constituency. While some of these findings can be reconciled with a view where lobbying is a vehicle for communicating information that is useful to maximize general welfare (the first finding discussed above in Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi, 2014) , it seems that lobbyists accumulate reputation not only in communicating the truth, but also in filtering the dimensions of a given policy proposal that are more salient for a specific politician's (electoral) success. It is otherwise hard to justify why connections are so important in Bertrand, Bombardini and Trebbi (2014) and why more politically aligned lobbyists are more selective in Hirsch et al. (2019) .
We conclude this section with a discussion of some recent work that makes use of one of the few comprehensive data sources where the content of messages sent to the policy maker are available to researchers. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 formalized the rulemaking process in the US by dictating that all Federal agencies publish a preliminary version of all rules "designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy" on the Federal Register and allow time for comments by interested parties. The APA also prescribes that agencies take address these comments when formulating the final version of these rules. Some earlier work on the subject by Yackee and Yackee (2006) has made use of the content of comments to 40 rules by 4 agencies to detect a tendency of those agencies to incorporate changes advocate by businesses, relative to non-business commenters. In a recent paper, Bertrand, Bombardini, Fisman, Hackinen and Trebbi (2019) exploit advances in NLP to automate and extend the analysis to a large share of the comments made publicly available by 150 U.S. Federal agencies. Although the focus of the study is the relationship between firms' commenting patterns and that of non-profits recipients of the firms' philanthropic giving, the study showcases the potential for the use of NLP in the study of informational lobbying. For example, the authors detect, by using latent semantic analysis 43 that the similarity between the content of comments by a non-profit and its benefactor increases in the time immediately after a donation occurs. A similar technique is used
in showing how such co-commenting is associated with an increase in similarity between the firm's comment and the final rule discussion by the agency. While it is currently hard to pinpoint the welfare effect of these messages, or even the exact degree to which policy is affected by these messages, this promises to be a rich path to explore information transmission.
LOBBYING OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES: CANADA AND THE E.U.
Lobbying in Canada
Canada with information on clients, registrants and topics discussed. However, the Registry imposes disclosure of the public officials contacted, a feature common to the E.U. registry, but different from the US. Another major difference is the lack of data on fees paid to lobbyists, a feature that makes comparisons in terms of the overall activity with the U.S. difficult. The number of lobbyists engaged offers one comparable dimension. The Commissioner's 2017-18 annual report counts 9,000 lobbyists, with just above 1,000 being external lobbyists and the rest being inhouse. This is in stark contrast with the more developed "external" lobbying industry in the US, which we discussed earlier. The sheer number of lobbyists, however, is comparable to the 11,654 count in the U.S. for the same year.
A very small number of academic papers has made use of the Registry data and in the context of specific policy issues, such as international trade (Stoyanov, 2009 ). An exception is work by Hickey (2014) who finds a much smaller importance of connections in Canadian lobbying compared to Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi (2014) , as only 6% of Canadian lobbyists tend to "follow" ministers who are reshuffled to different Cabinet positions.
44
Lobbying in the E.U. 44 The lesser importance of connections in Canada may be due to the fact in a Parliamentary system like Canada parties tend to be more important and personal connections to individual ministers may not be a key asset. Due to the voluntary nature of the Transparency Register and the lack of historical data, academic empirical research on lobbying using EU lobbying reports has been scarce. 45 A recent paper by Dellis and Sondermann (2017) has undertaken the task of matching the lobbying activity of firms in register with other balance sheet and industry affiliation from Orbis of Bureau van Dijk. The authors are able to find around 2000 firms in the Orbis database, which, should be noted, covers more than publicly traded firms (differently from Compustat). It is therefore not obvious how to compare, in terms of the frequency of lobbying, the almost 800 firms from
Compustat identified as lobbying by Huneeus and Kim (2019) and this sample.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper offers a brief Political Economy overview of recent empirical approaches to the study of special interests politics and lobbying. After a substantial amount of theoretical effort in the 1990s and 2000s on the role and effects of lobbying, careful data work is at this point moving forward the research frontier.
After presenting the main sources of available information and the crucial data disclosure issues, we organize the research between quid-pro-quo and informational work. In the context of quidpro-quo approaches, we also try to emphasize the few research applications where both policy supply and demand are resolved simultaneously -our preferred perspective to the study of the political behavior of firms. We discuss how some of the approaches reviewed in this article allow to explicitly tackle counterfactual policy outcomes under no lobbying. Ultimately, the welfare effects of lobbying and corporate advocacy should be studied under this perspective. Yet, it seems fair to say, they are still only partially understood and some of the structural modeling displays symptoms of misspecification.
45 Greenwood and Dreger (2013) provide an early description of the data and shows that the majority of lobbying entities are businesses or trade associations, with a small fraction of professional lobbyists relative to the US.
over time within Western democracies and so has political polarization and capture in the eyes of the median voter. The reader interested in how economic concentration transmits into policy inefficiency and into political distortions is well advised to invest effort in the study of lobbying and political influence. 46 These nonmarket activities appear the main cog in a mechanism through which such economic differences ossify, perpetuate over time, and further amplify inefficiencies in public policy.
